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SECRECY IN THE CONDUCT OF UNITED STATES
FOREIGN RELATIONS: RECENT
POLICY AND PRACTICE
Unfortunately, the system of classification which has evolved in the United
States has failed to meet the standards of an open and democratic society,
allowing too many papers to be classified for too long a time.,
-President Richard Nixon, March 8, 1972
The practice of secrecy in the conduct of United States foreign rela-
tions by the different branches of the Government raises several
important Constitutional issues and practical problems for the adminis-
tration of a unified and consistent foreign policy. Three of the more
important of these issues and problems will be considered in this note:
(1) the extent to which the practice of secrecy in the conduct of
foreign relations by the executive branch of the Government is autho-
rized by the Constitution;2
(2) the manner in which the practice of secrecy in the conduct of
foreign relations by the executive branch of the Government is to be
supervised by the other branches of the government;3 and
(3) the extent to which the inherent Constitutional powers of the
executive branch must yield to the legislative powers of the Congress
in the conduct of foreign relations.4
1. Statement by President Nixon, 8 WEEnKY CoMp. PREs. Docs. 542, 543 (March 18,
1972).
2. A scholarly and in-depth analysis of the executive and legislative roles in United
States foreign policy-making may be found in SENATE Comi. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
THsE FORALATION AND ADmNRATON oF UNrrE STATES FOREIGN POLICY, S. Doe. No.
24, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 791-989 (1961).
8. See Smith, Democracy, Secrecy, and National Security: Are They in Conflict?, 21
VrAL IssuFs 1 (1972). See also Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold:
The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 271 (1971) and Schlesinger, The
Secrecy Dilemma, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 12.
4. The practical aspects of this problem are summarized in a statement by Joseph
Bishop of the Yale Law School, reported in Hearings on U.S. Government Information
Policies and Practices-The Pentagon Papers Before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Government Operations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 82 (1971) [herein-
after cited as Hearings on the Pentagon Papers]. Other important issues raised by the
practice of secrecy in United States foreign relations include: whether secrecy in gov-
ernment in any form is consistent with the spirit of the Founding Fathers; whether the
Constitutional system of checks and balances is desirable in the field of foreign affairs;
whether the doctrine of executive privilege is implicit in the concept of separation of
powers; and whether, and to what extent, the executive branch may invoke the aid of
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The resolution of these issues is important because abuse of the
practice of secrecy in the conduct of foreign relations may seriously
erode the public's confidence in the Government.5 Additionally, the
unsuccessful resolution of these issues may result in hostility and ill will
between the executive and legislative branches of the Government which
may carry over into the sphere of domestic policy-making.
The processes of United States foreign relations are conducted pri-
marily by the executive branch, with the necessary cooperation of the
Congress, and with the occasional guidance of the federal courts. Within
the executive branch of the Government, the Executive Office of the
President and the Departments of State and Defense exercise the prin-
cipal foreign affairs powers;8 but the Congress, with its many specialized
foreign affairs committees and subcommittees,7 also exercises important
foreign affairs responsibilities. The conduct of United States foreign
relations may include the declaration and prosecution of war, the
negotiation and ratification of treaties, the provision for and administra-
tion of economic and military assistance, the regulation of foreign com-
merce, and the conclusion of other non-treaty agreements touching on
political, economic, and cultural interests.8
Given the basic institutions and processes of United States foreign
policy-makingP it is apparent that secrecy in matters of foreign relations
the judicial branch to protect government secrets. For a brief introduction to many of
these issues, see the statement of the Hon. Arthur J. Goldberg; id., at 9.
5. A lengthy overview of the American public's access to government information is
contained in Forkosch, Freedom of Information in the United States, 20 DEPAUL L.
REv. 1 (1970). See also Lake, Lying Around Washington, 1 FOREIGN PolIcy 91 (1971).
6. See OFIcE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL
1971/72, at 57, 80, 119 (1971).
7. The Senate and the House each have four committees which concentrate on prob-
lems in the foreign affairs area.
8. The foregoing aspects of United States foreign relations are a mixture of presi-
dential and congressional powers and responsibilities. Other aspects of United States
foreign policy-making include such routine processes as exchanges of diplomatic mes-
sages, exchanges of statistical information, and regulation of tourism and international
commercial transactions.
9. The institutions and processes of United States foreign policy-making are in fact
exceedingly complex. See THE FORmULATON AND ADMINISTRATION OF UNITED STATES
FOREIGN PoLicy, supra note 2. It is important to note, however, that the actual formula-
tion and administration of United States foreign policy is a very fluid process, varying
in institutional form and substance with different administrations, and a process in
many ways reflective of the personal views of the President and his chief foreign policy
advisors. Hence, a true understanding of the current administration of United States
foreign policy requires an insight into the intimate working relationships of the nation's
foreign policy leaders. See Leacacos, The Nixon NSC, 2 FOREIGN POLIcy 2 (1971); Dest-
ler, State and Presidential Leadership, 48 FOREIGN SER vcE J. 30 (1971); Beloff, Professor
Bismarck goes to Washington: Kissinger on the Job, 224 THE ATLANTIc 77 (1969); and
Barnet, The National Security Managers and the National Interest, 1 POL. & SoC'Y 257(1971).
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may be practiced on three levels: secrecy practiced between agencies
within a single branch of the Government; secrecy practiced between the
different branches of the Government; and secrecy practiced between
a branch of the Government and the public. In any given case, however,
the primary manifestation of the practice of secrecy is the invocation of
the doctrine of executive privilege'O0 and the classification of docu-
ments."1
One obvious reason for the maintenance of secrecy in the conduct of
foreign relations is that, at least in some areas, secrecy is vital to our
national defense and foreign policy. It is well argued that the need for
"such secrecy with respect to highly sensitive decisions of this sort
[where lives of American soldiers or the security of the nation is at stake]
10. The doctrine of executive privilege may be defined as
the constitutional authority of the President to withhold documents or infor-
mation in his possession or in the possession of the executive branch from
compulsory process of the legislative or judicial branch of the Government.
This doctrine is implicit in the separation of powers established by the Con-
stitution.
Statement of the Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Hearings on, the Pentagon Papers, supra
note 4, at 359. Not entirely in accord with Mr. Rehnquist's definition is the historical
analysis of Senator J.W. Fulbright:
A review of past usage, and precedent shows that "executive privilege" is not
a legal or constitutional principle but simply a custom, a survival of the
royalist principle that "the King can do no wrong." Legal scholars regard
the claim to an absolute executive discretion in matters of providing or with-
holding information as an anachronistic survival of monarchical privilege, an
extension from King to President of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Fulbright, The High Cost of Secrecy, in Hearings on Security Classification Problems
Involving Subsection b(l) of the Freedom of Information Act, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess.,
pt. 7, at 2912, 2914-15 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Security Classification
Problems). Both Mr. Rehnquist and Senator Fulbright would agree that the doctrine
of executive privilege is the authority or absolute discretion of the President to withhold
information from Congress, the courts, and the public. Constitutional authority for
the doctrine of executive privilege is considered in more detail in section II. A. znfra.
An excellent analysis of the evolution of the doctrine of executive privilege is found
in Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.LA. L. Rrv. 1044 (1965).
11. The expression "classification of documents," unless specifically qualified, refers
to both original and derivative classification. Original classification of documents occurs
when
officials designated to have original classification authority exercise independent
judgement to classify information based solely on the consideration of whether
its unauthorized disclosure would inflict prejudicial or, or [sic] a greater degree
of damage to the national defense interest.
Derivative classification of documents occurs when
any person authorized to receive and disseminate classified information in any
form treats that information in the same way as the originator with respect
to classification of content and markings.
Statement of David 0. Cooke, Hearings on the Pentagon Papers, supra note 4, at 393.
Thus, the difference between original and derivative classification is that in the case
of original classification, the classifying official need not be guided by previous classifica-
tion determinations. This is not so in the case of derivative classification.
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excludes not merely Congress but all but an infinitesimal number of
the employees and officials of the executive branch as well."'12
Another reason for the maintenance of secrecy is the preservation of
the integrity of the decision-making process. Committees of Congress
meet in secret sessions to "mark up" bills and judges of appellate courts
meet secretly to reach their decisions.13 Why should not decision-makers
of the executive branch meet secretly? It would seem important that
subordinates in the agencies of the executive branch be permitted to
voice their opinions and recommendations without fear of being called
before a congressional committee to account for their participation. As
one high official in the executive branch has observed:
Now, if you can imagine ... an ambassador sitting in Moscow or any capital
you can name and saying, "This is what I want to say to the President, but if
this is going to wind up on the front page of the Washington Post or the New
York Times, I can't possibly say it flatly. I am going to have to say it differently,
or it will do great damage, because the damage to be done will outweigh the
good I am trying to accomplish." 4
A third reason for maintaining secrecy in the conduct of foreign
relations, illustrated by a White House letter to Mr. Epstein following
the Epstein v. Resor decision,' 5 is that foreign governments must be
able to deal with the United States, secure in the knowledge that our
government will not be required to disclose information and proposals
tendered in confidence.' 6
In light of the issues which have just been raised, it is the purpose of
this note to explore the practice of secrecy in foreign relations matters
by the executive branch from the perspective of Executive Order 11,652,
which concerns the classification of documents, and from the counter-
vailing perspective of the Freedom of Information Act, which concerns
the release of government documents to members of Congress and the
public.17
12. Statement of the Hon. William H. Rhenquist, Hearings on the Pentagon Papers,
supra note 4, at 364. See generally HoUsE COMM=TTEE ON GoVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
SAFEGUAmDiNG OFmcL INFOMATION iN TH INTERFTs OF DEFENSE OF THE UNrrED
SrATms: THE STATUS OF Exncuriv ORDER 10501, H.R. REP. No. 2456, 87th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1962).
13. Statement of the Hon. William H. Rhenquist, Hearings on the Pentagon
Papers, supra note 4, at 364-65. See also Statement of Joseph Bishop, id. at 35.
14. Statement of the Hon. William B. Macomber, Jr., id. at 900.
15. See notes 117-119 infra, and accompanying text.
16. Statement of the Hon. William B. Macomber, Jr., Hearings on the Pentagon
Papers, supra note 4, at 900.
17. See Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. -, 37 Fed. Reg. 5209 (1972), 50 U.S.C.A.§ 401, note (Supp. July 1972) (Classification and Declassification of National Security
Information and Material); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
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I
THE PRACTICE OF SECRECY BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH:
HISTORY, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY
A. HI-IhRiCAL BACKGROUND
Secrecy in government, especially the doctrine of executive privilege
and the classification of documents, is a firmly established feature in
the history of American government. 8 In his first administration, Presi-
dent Washington, through his Secretary of War, was asked by the
House of Representatives for information concerning the expedition of
General St. Glair into the Northwest Territory.19 The President called
a cabinet meeting
because it was the first example and he wished that so far as it should become
a precedent, it should be rightly conducted. He could readily conceive that
there might be papers of so secret a nature as they ought not to be given up.20
The request was granted, however, when the President determined that
disclosure would not adversely affect the public interest. In 1796, acting
upon an appropriations bill for payments under the Jay Treaty, the House
of Representatives requested that the President furnish the instructions
given the American ministers who negotiated the Treaty. President
Washington declined to provide this information, stating, in a formal
message to the House, that to do so
would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on
future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and
mischief, in relation to other powers.21
Subsequent administrations almost without exception have similarly
exercised the doctrine of executive privilege or have withheld informa-
18. The authors of the Constitution, influenced by earlier English political philoso-
phers, were very much aware of the uses and abuses of secrecy and its ramifications for
the new government. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 10, at 1056, for a recounting of
English and colonial precedents of legislative inquiry into executive conduct. A prin-
cipal framer of the Constitution reflected several years after the Convention:
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be
their own governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives.
A popular government without popular information or the means of acquir-
ing it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both.
Letters from James Madison to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, cited in Hearings on the
Pentagon Papers, supra note 4, at 815. It is interesting to note that the Convention
which met in Philadelphia in 1787 was itself conducted in secret sessions. 1 Tim
R.coRs OF THE FEmRL CONVENTION 13 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
19. For an excellent account of the St. Clair expedition, see T. TAYLOR, GRAND
INQUEST 17 (1955).
20. 1 THE WarriNGs OF THomas JEFFERSON 189-90 (Ford ed. 1892).
21. J.D. RIcaARgsoN, I MssAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PREsmENTS 194-95 (1898).
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tion from Congress or from the public by the classification of docu-
ments.22
The present system of classification of documents dates from the First
World War.23 A General Order issued by the American Expeditionary
Force Headquarters, dated November 21, 1917, provided for three levels
of classification--"confidential," "secret," and "for official circulation
only." A fourth classification--"restricted"-appeared in 1935, with a
notice that information so classified affected the national defense within
the meaning of the Espionage Act of 1917.24
Executive Order 8381 25-issued March 22, 1940, by President Roosevelt
-recognized the military classification system and defined the material
subject to such classification, relying for authority upon the Espionage
Act of 1938.26 Executive Order 8381 was superseded by Executive Order
10,104,27 issued February 1, 1950, by President Truman. This order
introduced the "top secret" classification and gave the President and the
22. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 10, at 1093, 1094, 1096. Congress, through its members
and committees, has made policy pronouncements on the practice of secrecy by the ex-
ecutive branch in the conduct of foreign relations. As early as 1816, the Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations reported: "The nature of transactions with foreign nations,
moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends
upon secrecy and dispatch." S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 8 U.S. SENATE RioaRTs 24(1816), cited in Heaiings on the Pentagon Papers, supra note 4, at 361. There have
been many other remarks by committees and members of Congress which recognize
the power of the President to withhold information from Congress in matters of
foreign relations. See, e.g., 41 CONG. REC. 97-98 (1906) (remarks of Senator Spooner);
statement of the Hon. William H. Rhenquist, Hearings on the Pentagon Papers, supra
note 4, at 362.
23. Much of the following history of document classification by the executive branch
is discussed in: FOREIGN AFFAms DIvisION, LEGISLATIVE RI xERENC SERvICE, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., SEcuRrry CLASSIFICATION AS A PROBLEM IN THE CONGRES-
sioNAL ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY (Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter cited as SECuRrrY
CLASSMCATION AS A PROBLEM].
24. Id. at 3.
25. Exec. Order No. 8381, 5 Fed. Reg. 1147 (1940) (Defining Certain Vital Military
and Naval Installations and Equipment).
26. Specifically, Exec. Order No. 8381 relied upon the following language of the
espionage law:
Whenever, in the interests of national defense, the President shall define
certain vital military and naval installations or equipment as requiring pro-
tection against the general dissemination of information relating thereto, it
shall be unlawful to make any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or
graphical representation of such vital military or naval installations or equip-
ment without first obtaining permission of the commanding officer of the
military or naval post, camp, or station ....
Espionage Act of 1938, 18 U.S.C. § 795(a) (1970).
27. Exec. Order No. 10,104, 15 Fed. Reg. 597 (1950) (Defining Certain Vital Military
and Naval Installations and Equipment as Requiring Protection Against the General
Dissemination of Information Relative Thereto).
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Secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force delegable authority
to classify designated information. Executive Order 10,290,28 issued by
President Truman on September 24, 1951, broadened the classification
system to include cassification by non-military agencies and depart-
ments and to authorize such classification to safeguard security as well
as defense information.
Executive Order 10,501,29 issued by President Eisenhower in 1953 and
amended by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, was the model for the
present system of document classification. Executive Order 10,501
adopted three dassifications--"top secret," "secret," and "confidential."
Under the Order, original classification authority was exercised by "the
head of the department, agency, or Governmental unit concerned or by
such responsible officers or employees as he, or his representative, may
designate for that purpose."8 0 Altogether, the heads (or their representa-
tives) of thirty-five executive departments and agencies were authorized
to classify documents in the interest of national defense.81 The heads of
twelve additional departments and agencies also exercised non-delegable
original classification authority.82 The Order further laid down guide-
lines for the actual classification, declassification, downgrading, and
upgrading of documents and other materials; rules for accountability:
and dissemination; procedures for transmission of classified informa-
tion; methods of disposal and destruction; interpretation of the Order's
provisions by the Attorney General; and review of the Order by a
presidential staff member, by the National Security Council, and by the
concerned departments and agencies.
B. PRES r UNTED STATES PoLic
1. Executive Order 11,652-A Summary
Well supported by historical precedent, the practice of secrecy in
foreign relations by the executive branch is now regulated by Executive
28. Exec. Order No. 10,290, 16 Fed. Reg. 9795 (1951) (P1rescribing Regulations
Establishing Minimum Standards for the Classification, Transmission, and Handling,
by Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch of Official Information Which
Requires Safeguarding in the Interests of the Security of the United States).
29. Exec. Order No. 10,501, 18 Fed. Reg. 7049 (1953) (Safeguarding Official Informa-
tion in the Interests of Defense of the United States).
30. Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 306, 307, § 2(a) (1972).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 2(b).
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Order 11,652,33 issued by President Nixon in March 1972, and made
effective June 1, 1972.
Three major changes were effected by Executive Order 11,652: (1)
reduction in the number of personnel in the executive branch with
original classification authority, (2) provision for speedier declassification
of documents as per a pre-defined schedule, and (3) creation of an
Interagency Classification Review Committee to insure compliance with
the Order.84
Specifically, the system of document classification under the Order
retains the three terms and definitions of "top secret," "secret," and
"confidential."85 Authority to classify is limited to the heads and senior
principal deputies of thirteen departments and agencies.8s The heads
and senior principal deputies of thirteen additional departments and
agencies are authorized to classify at the "secret" or "confidential"
33. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. -, 37 Fed. Reg. 5209 (1972), 50 U.S.C.A. § 401,
note (Supp. July 1972) (Classification and Declassification of National Security Informa.
tion and Material).
34. The White House, Office of the White House Press Secretary Fact Sheet on
Executive Order No. 11,652, August 3, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Fact Sheet on
Executive Order No. 11,652].
35. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. -, 37 Fed. Reg. 5209 (1972), 50 U.S.C.A. § 401,
note (Supp. July 1972). The classifications are defined as follows:(A) "Top Secret." "Top Secret" refers to that national security information
or material which requires the highest degree of protection. The test for as-
signing "Top Secret" classification shall be whether its unauthorized disclosure
could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the na-
tional security. Examples of "exceptionally grave damage" include armed
hostilities against the United States or its allies; disruption of foreign relations
vitally affecting the national security; the compromise of vital national defense
plans or complex cryptologic and communications intelligence systems; the
revelation of sensitive intelligence operations; and the disdosure of scientific
or technological developments relating to national security. This classifica-
tion shall be used with the utmost restraint.
(B) "Secret." "Secret" refers to that national security information or material
which requires a substantial degree of protection. The test for assigning
"Secret" classification shall be whether its unauthorized disclosure could rea-
sonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Examples
of "serious damage" include disruption of foreign relations significantly
affecting the national security; significant impairment of a program or policy
directly related to the national security; revelation of significant military
plans or intelligence operations; and compromise of significant scientific or
technological developments relating to national security. The classification
"Secret" shall be sparingly used.
(C) "Confidential." "Confidential" refers to that national security informa-
tion or material which requires protection. The test for assigning "Con-
fidential" classification shall be whether its unauthorized disclosure could
reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security.
Id. § 1.
36. Id. § 2(a).
[Vol. 6: 187
Secrecy in Foreign Relations
levels only.37 The Order further specifies procedures for classification;38
downgrading and declassffication (including precise schedules therefor);39
and access, marking, safekeeping, accountability, transmission, disposi-
tion, and destruction of information and material.40 The Order provides
for the establishment of the Interagency Classification Review Com-
mittee,41 which has the general responsibility of insuring compliance
with the Order, and, more specifically, the responsibility to receive and
consider suggestions and complaints regarding the Order and to recom-
mend corrective action.42 Information and material covered by the
Atomic Energy Act (1954) is expressly excluded by the Order.43 Of
particular note is the inclusion in the Order of administrative and
judicial sanctions to be invoked against those who over-classify and those
who under-classify. Such is the formal policy of the executive branch
today.
All of the departments and agencies of the executive branch affected
by Executive Order 11,652 have, pursuant to a National Security
Council directive46 governing implementation of the Order, issued their
own policy guidelines reiterating and implementing the policy and pro-
cedures of Executive Order 11,652.46
37. Id. § 2(b).
38. Id. § 4.
39. Id. § 5.
40. Id. § 6.
41. Members of the Committee include the General Counsels of the Departments
of State, Defense, and Justice; the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency;
and representatives from the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Security
Council Staff. President Nixon selected John S.D. Eisenhower, former U.S. Ambassador
to Belgium, to serve as the first chairman of the Committee. Fact Sheet on Executive
Order 11,652, supra note 34, at 1.
42. Exec. Order No. 11,652 at § 7, 3 C.F.R. -, 37 Fed. Reg. 5209 (1972), 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 401 note (Supp. July 1972).
43. Id. § 8.
44. Id. § 13(A) provides:
Administrative and Judicial Action. Any officer or employee of the United
States who unnecessarily classifies or overciassifies information or material
shall be notified that his actions are in violation of the terms of this order or
of a directive of the President issued through the National Security Council.
Repeated abuse of the dassification process shall be grounds for an admin-
istrative reprimand. In any case where the Departmental committee or the
Interagency Classification Review Committee finds that unnecessary classifica-
tion or overdassification has occurred, it shall make a report to the head of
the Department concerned in order that corrective steps may be taken.45. National Security Council Directive Concerning the Classification, Downgrading,
Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information, 37 Fed. Reg.10,055 (1972).46. The rules and regulations of the more important agenfes and departments
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2. Executive Order 11,652 and Executive Privilege
The policy and procedure by which executive privilege is presently
exercised is to a large extent the same as that of Presidents Kennedy
and Johnson,47 as is evidenced by a memorandum, dated March 24,
1969, from the President to concerned department and agency heads.48
This memorandum provides the procedure by which requests for
information are submitted to the President for approval where the
department or agency head is unsure of the need for secrecy. The claim
of executive privilege is thus made only with the express personal
approval of the President.
President Nixon's March 24th Memorandum further provides that
a request for classified information, particularly when made by a com-
mittee or member of Congress, be held in abeyance and that attempts
be made to satisfy the request by alternative means.49 Thus, this informal
policy of "negotiation and accommodation" serves to limit the frequent
exercise of the executive privilege.50
The President's March 24th Memorandum also included the follow-
ing statement: "[he Executive branch has the responsibility of with-
holding certain information, the disclosure of which would be incom-
which have implemented Executive Order No. 11,652 may be found in 10 C.F.R. pt, 9,
App. A (1972) (Atomic Energy Commission), 22 C.F.R. Pt. 9 (1972) (Dep't of State), 28
C.F.R. pt. 17 (1972) (Dep't of Justice), 32 C.F.R. pt. 159(1972) (Dep't of Defense), and
32 C.F.R. pt. 1900 (1972) (Central Intelligence Agency).
47. Letter from President Richard Nixon to the Hon. John E. Moss, April 7, 1969,
in Hearings on the Pentagon Papers, supra note 4, at 6. See also statement of the
Hon. William H. Rehnquist, id. at 358.
48. Richard Nixon, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, March 24, 1969, id. at 7.
'49. Id.The Memorandum continues: "Care shall be taken to indicate that the
purpose of this request is to protect the privilege pending the determination, and that
the request does not constitute a claim of privilege." Id.
50. The practical consequences of the policy of "negotiation and accommodation"
well illustrate the relationship of document classification to executive privilege:
When a Member or committee of Congress attempts to obtain a specific
piece of classified information and is denied it, the problem merges with that
of executive privilege. For though the information sought may be classified,
withholding it from Congress apparently is more likely to be based on ex-
ecutive privilege than on the basis of classification. To deny it on the grounds
of classification might imply either that the Member of Congress seeking it
did not have a need to know or that he was not trustworthy.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AS A PROBLEM, supra note 23, at 28.
The President's policy of "negotiation and accommodation" was recently reaffirmed.
Claiming well-established precedent, and citing that the privilege was invoked only
three times in his first administration in response to congressional requests, the Presi-
dent declared that the scope of the executive privilege extended to former, as well as
to present, Presidential staff members. N.Y. Times, March 13, 1973, at 16, col. S.
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patible with the public interest .. . .,51 The policy of the executive
branch therefore, is to maintain secrecy in those areas of the conduct of
foreign relations encompassing not only information classified for de-
fense and security reasons, but also such information classified for the
reason of incompatibility with the public interest.
C. AuTHoPirr FOR ExEcuTVE ORDER 11,652 AND
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Not surprisingly, concern over the executive branch's policy of secrecy
in government affairs, especially concern over the policy of secrecy in
foreign affairs, has led to investigations of, and challenges to the Presi-
dent's Constitutional and statutory authority to classify documents and
to invoke the executive privilege. In 1970, the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations requested from the Department of State an explana-
tion of the legal basis for Executive Order 10,501, the predecessor of
Executive Order 11,652.59 The Legal Adviser of the State Department,
with the approval of the Justice Department, referred the Committee
on Foreign Relations to the Report of the Commission on Government
Security which appeared in 1957.53 With respect to the President's
Constitutional authority for the issuance of Executive Order 10,501, the
Commission Report observed:
Pertinent sections of the Constitution appear to contain no express authority
for the issuance of an order such as Executive Order 10501. However, the requi-
site implied authority would seem to lie within article II which says in section 1:
"The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America"; and in section 2: "The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States"; and in section 3: "[Hie shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed."
When these provisions are considered in light of the existing Presidential
authority to appoint and remove executive officers directly responsible to him,
there is demonstrated the broad Presidential supervisory and regulatory au-
thority over the internal operations of the executive branch. By issuing the
proper Executive or administrative order he exercises this power of direction
51. Richard Nixon, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, March 24, 1969, Hearings on the Pentagon Papers, supra note 4, at 1.
52. Letter from Senator Fulbright to John R. Stevenson, in Hearings on U.S. Security
Commitments Abroad Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 9, at 2010 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on U.S. Security Commit-
ments Abroad].
53. REPORT OF THE COMfISSION ON GOvERNmENT SEURTY OF 1957, 84TH CONG., Isr
SFss. (1957) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT]. The Commission on
Government Security was established by Congress in 1955. Chairman of the Commission
was Loyd Wright, a prominent California attorney; other members of the Commission
included Congressmen, educators, scientists, newspapermen, and representatives of
labor and management.
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and supervision over his subordinates in the discharge of their duties. He thus
"takes care" that the laws are being faithfully executed by those acting in his
behalf; and in the instant case the pertinent laws would involve espionage,
sabotage, and related statutes, should such Presidential authority not be predi-
cated upon statutory authority or direction.54
With respect to the President's statutory authority for the issuance of
Executive Order 10,501, the Commission Report continued:
While there is no specific statutory authority for ... Executive Order 10501,
various statutes do afford a basis upon which to justify the issuance of the
order.55
The Commission Report specifically cited the "Housekeeping" Act
(1789),56 the espionage laws,57 the National Security Act (1947),Gs and
the Internal Security Act (1950).59 Supplementing the Commission
Report, the State Department in response to the Senate committee's
request, made additional references to provisions of the Atomic Energy
Act,60 the Freedom of Information Act,6 ' the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, 62 the Mutual Security Act of 1954,68 and the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act6--all examples of statutory support for the classifica-
tion of documents under Executive Order 10,501.65 Nevertheless, that
specific statutory authority for Executive Order 10,501 ever existed
remains at least open to doubt.6
54. Id. at 158.
55. Id.
56. 5 US.C. § 301 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 2, 1789, 1 Stat. 65).
Prior to 1958 this Act was proffered as the authority for withholding government
information, however the Act was amended by Act of Aug. 12, 1958, 72 Stat. 547, to
include the following provision: "This section does not authorize withholding informa-
tion from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public."
57. 18 US.C. § 795(a) (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Jan. 12, 1988, 52 Stat. 3).
See note 26 supra. See also 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (1970).
58. Act of July 26, 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495.
59. Act of Sept. 28, 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987.
60. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2162 (1970).
61. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). Subsection (c) provides that
"[this section is not authority to withhold information from Congress."
62. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2394 (1970).
63. Mutual Security Act of 1954, 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1970).
64. Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2585 (1970).
65. The State Department reply to the Senate committee's inquiry is found in
Hearings on U.S. Security Commitments Abroad, supra note 52, at 2008. For a discus-
sion of the State Department reply, see Szcuarry CLAssIFICATXON AS A PROBLEm, supra
note 23, at 5.
66. Although Congress has recognized the classification system in several of its
enactments (see notes 56 to 64 supra), it has not to date attempted a comprehensive
regulation of the classification system. Perhaps this inactivity is tacit recognition of
the President's classification powers. On the other hand, Congress has made its inten-
tions explicit on a number of occasions by expressly providing that legislative
recognition of the classification system is not to be construed as authority to withhold
information from Congress. See Act of May 13, 1950, ch. 185, 64 Stat. 159. See also
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The classification of documents is now regulated by Executive Order
11,652. Like Executive Order 10,501, Executive Order 11,652 claims as its
authority, by vague reference, the powers vested in the President by
article 11, sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Constitution. These same vaguely
defined Constitutional powers also constitute the claimed authority for
exercise of the executive privilege.67
While the preamble to Executive Order 11,652 briefly refers to the
Freedom of Information Act, legal advisors in the executive branch
concede that there is no express statutory authority for the issuance of
Executive Order 11,652.68 This uncertainty which surrounds the autho-
rity, both Constitutional and statutory, for the invocation of executive
privilege and the issuance of Executive Order 11,652, requires some
further analysis.
1. Constitutional Authority
The President's Constitutional authority to issue Executive Order
11,652, for the classification of documents, and to invoke the executive
privilege, derives from article II, sections 1, 2, and 8 of the Constitu-
tion.6 9 Additional Constitutional authority may perhaps be implied from
the Separation of Powers doctrine.70 The Constitutional powers of the
President in the conduct of foreign relations have been developed and
consistently upheld by the Supreme Court in numerous cases. 71
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970). The consequences of such an
ambiguous congressional position on the issue are obvious:
Although the doctrine of executive privilege is controversial, as a practical
matter when information is in the hands of the executive branch the President
is physically or administratively able to withhold it if he deems it advisable.
SEcuRY CLASSIFICATION AS A PROBLEm, supra note 23, at 28.
67. See the statement of the Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Hearings on the Pentagon
Papers, supra note 4, at 360.
68. Letter from D.O. Cooke to William S. Moorhead, July 26, 1971, in Hearings on
the Pentagon Papers, supra note 4, at 754. Neither the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations nor the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was ever fully
satisfied by the conclusions of the WIGrr CoMMISSboN REnoRT, supra note 53. Ap-
parently the executive branch now prefers to base its authority for the issuance of
Executive Order No. 11,652 solely upon the President's implied Constitutional powers.
See note 54 supra, and accompanying text.
69. See note 54 supra, and accompanying text.
70. Congressional denial of the executive branch's power to classify defense and
security information may violate the Separation of Powers doctrine. For an elabora-
tion of this argument, see the opinion of Chief Judge Bazelon in Soucie v. David,
448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
71. For example, in the Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863), the Court sustained,
in a 5-4 decision, the President's power, as Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy, to suppress an insurrection against the state governments or the
Federal Government by ordering a blockade of certain Southern ports. In an 8-1
19731
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In the leading case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp,,72
the Court, by Mr. Justice Sutherland, expounded upon the theory of
"inherent powers" of the President in the conduct of foreign relations
by stating:
The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to
maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been
mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government
as necessary concomitants of nationality....
. In this vast external realm [the conduct of foreign relations], with its
important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone
has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.73
The Court urged, with respect to the conduct of foreign relations,
that Congress refrain from limiting the freedom and discretion of the
President. On the subject of secrecy, the Court at least implied that the
President possessed the power to withhold information concerning
foreign affairs, even from Congress.74
In Chicago and Southern Air Lines v. Waterman,75 the Court re-
affirmed the power of the President, as Commander-in-Chief and as
"the Nation's organ for foreign affairs" to withhold "information
properly held secret." 76 Again the Court denied the power of the
decision delivered by Mr. Justice McKenna, the Court in Mackenzie v. Hare, 289 U.S.
299 (1915), expounded briefly upon the theory of "inherent powers" of the Govern-
ment in the conduct of foreign relations:
But there may be powers implied, necessary or inddental to the expressed
powers. As a government, the United States is invested with all the attributes
of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of na-
tionality, especially those which concern its relations and intercourse with other
countries. We should hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing such powers.
Id. at 311. A unanimous Court in Oetjen v. Central Leather Company, 246 U.S. 297
(1918), reaffirmed the Court's reluctance to meddle with the power of the executive
and legislative branches in the conduct of foreign relations. The Court stated:
The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the
Constitution to the Executive and Legislative--"the political"--Departments
of the Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of
this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.
Id. at 302.
72. 299 US. 304 (1986).
73. Id. at 818-19.
74. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the con-
ditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time
of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the
form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. Secrecy in respect of informa-
tion gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure
of it productive of harmful results.
Id. at 320.
75. 33 U.S. 108 (1948).
76. Id. at 111.
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judiciary to review executive decisions as to foreign policy because such
decisions were "essentially political."77
In a 6-3 opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, the Court in United
States v. Reynoldss upheld a claim of executive privilege on the basis
of the executive branch's "inherent powers" and on the basis of a
statute.79 With few exceptions the Court has thus sustained the Presi-
dent's Constitutional authority for withholding information and material
bearing on foreign affairs.
2. Statutory Authority
Statutory authority for the issuance of Executive Order 11,652 and
for the classification of documents is provided by 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1):
This section does not apply to matters that are-(1) specifically required by
Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or
foreign policy; . . . 80
Section 552(b)(1) has been tested in the courts on a number of occa-
sions, and in each of these cases the courts have sustained the power of
the executive branch to withhold information in the interest of the
national defense or foreign policy. In Epstein v. Resor,81 the first test
of section 552(b)(1), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
77. Id.
78. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
79. In this case, brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the widows of three
civilians killed in a military plane crash sought the release of an official report on the
crash for use as evidence in their case. The Secretary of the Air Force denied their re-
quest, claiming executive privilege in that release would seriously hamper "national
security, flying safety, and the development of highly technical and secret military
equipment." The Secretary also relied on the predecessor to 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970):
The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations not incon-
sistent with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its
officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and the
custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property appertaining
to it.
The Court, while sustaining the Secretary's position, refused to uphold an absolute
executive privilege. "Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated
to the caprice of executive officers." 345 U.S. at 9-10. A 1958 amendment to the prede-
cessor of 5 U.S.C. § 301 added the language: "This section does not authorize with-
holding information from the public or limiting the availability of records to thepublic." Act of Aug. 12, 1958,72 Stat. 547. See note 56 supra. See generally MEMO-
RAND UM OF LEGAL STAFF, HousE GOvERNMENT OPERATIONS CoMMrFTEE, 92ND CONG., Isr
SESS., ON THE STATEMENT OF WuIaAma H. R-HNQUIsT, AssISTANT ATIoRNEY GENERAL,
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, TESTIFYING ON EXECUTrVE PRIVILEGE,
June 29, 1971, in Hearings on the Pentagon Papers, supra note 4, at 788.
80. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
81. 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 598 U.S. 965 (1970). See note 112 infra,
and accompanying text.
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affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant Secretary of the Army
in holding that the jurisdiction of the federal courts does not extend
to cases involving information falling within the exemptions listed in
subsection (b) of section 552.82 In Mink v. EPA,83 thirty-three members
of Congress in both their official and private capacities sought to obtain
documents pertaining to the proposed Amchitka nuclear test explosion
under the Freedom of Information Act. The district court dismissed the
complaint as brought in the plaintiffs' official capacity on the grounds
that they had failed to state a justiciable case in view of the Separation
of Powers doctrine.84 The district court denied the relief sought in
plaintiffs' private capacity on the ground that the documents fell within
the (b)(1) and (b)(5)85 exemptions. The judgment of the district court
was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a decision which failed to reach
the Constitutional issues raised in the case. Rather, the Court held that
the language of section 552(b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act
precluded the forced disclosure of documents classified pursuant to an
executive order, and further held that the courts could not examine the
documents en camara to determine whether the classification was
proper.8 6
In Moss/Reid/Fisher v. Laird,87 two Congressmen and the director
of the Freedom of Information Center sought access to the "Pentagon
Papers"88 under the Freedom of Information Act. The court granted
summary judgment for the defendant Secretary of Defense on the
ground that the documents requested fell under the (b)(1) exemption.
82. In addition to the exemption for national defense and foreign affairs secrets,
§ 552(b) also exempts information solely related to internal personnel rules of an
agency, information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute, privileged trade
secrets and financial or commercial information obtained from a person, inter-agency
or intra-agency memoranda, personnel and medical files, investigatory files compiled for
law enforcement purposes, data pertaining to the regulation or supervision of financial
institutions, and geological or geophysical information concerning wells. Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l)-(9) 1970).
83. 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd 41 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1978).
84. See note 70 supra.
85. Subsection (b)(5) exempts "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with
the agency."
86. 41 U.S.L.W. 4201, 4204 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1978). The majority opinion, by Mr. Justice
White, derived considerable support from the legislative history of 5 U.S.C. § 552, a
legislative history quite different from that reported in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Douglas.87. Civil Action No. 1254-71 (D.D.C. 1971).
88. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, HISTORY OF U.S. DECION-MAKING PROCESS ON ViEr NAM
PoLIcy (1968). See STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON ARMED SmVCES, 92ND CONG., lsr Sss.,
UNrrED STATES-VIm NAr RErATxroNs, 1945-67 (Comm. Print 1971).
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Thus, in view of the judicial application of section 552, it seems dear
that both the President's classification of documents by executive order
and his exercise of executive privilege result in secrecy with respect
to Congress and with respect to the public. It also seems clear that
section 552(c) is not an effective restraint on the President's powers
vis-h-vis Congress.89
HI
THE SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE VIS-A-VIS CONGRESS
AND THE PUBLIC
A. EXECUTVE PRIVILEGE AND THM CoNGpsSIoNAL RoLE IN
UNITED STATES FoREGN Poucy
Congress is empowered by the Constitution to exercise an important
role in the field of foreign affairs.90 With respect to the powers of
Congress under article I, section 8 of the Constitution, the Court has
recognized the existence of certain auxiliary powers, including the
"power of inquiry" in matters bearing upon the issue of secrecy.91
89. See note 61 sup ra.
90. "Secrecy" is expressly mentioned only once in the Constitution-a reference to
the authority of each house to publish a journal of its proceedings, "excepting such
Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy." US. CONSr. art. I. § 5. Article I, sec-
tion 8 of the Constitution grants to Congress power to legislate on matters of national
defense, foreign commerce, tariff policy, and naturalization. Section 8 concludes with a
grant of Congressional power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8. These Congressional powers in the realm of foreign
affairs have been recognized by the Supreme Court in numerous cases. In the Prize
Cases, 67 US. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (see note 71 supra, and accompanying text), the
Court, while affirming the President's actions, expressed some doubt as to whether, in
the absence of de facto ratification by Congress, Congressional "approving [or] legaliz-
ing" was not first necessary. The Court said:
Without admitting that such an act [of Congress "approving, legalizing, and
making valid all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President'] was
necessary under the circumstances, it is plain that if the President had in any
manner assumed powers which it was necessary should have the authority or
sanction of Congress, that on the well known principle of law, "omnis rati-
habitio retrotrahitur et mandato equiparatur," this ratification has operated
to perfectly cure the defect.
Id. at 671.
91. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 US. 135, 174 (1927).
... [Olne, that the two houses of Congress, in their separate relations, possess
not only such powers as are expressly granted to them by the Constitution, but
such auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to make the express
powers effective; ....
We are of the opinion that the power of inquiry-with process to enforce it
-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
Id. at 173-74. See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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The legislative power of Congress in article 1, section 1,02 is an
additional check upon the foreign affairs power of the President, and
was the basis of the holding in the leading case of Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Company v. Sawyer.93 Furthermore, judicial reluctance to inquire
into matters of congressional powers expressed in earlier decisions94
may give way to more explicit judicial definition and 'separation" of
executive and legislative powers in the area of foreign relations. Such
a prediction was made by Mr. Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr.05
The congressional role in foreign relations is further defined by the
1966 statute96 enacting Title 5 of the United States Code into positive
law:
An Executive agency, on rec[uest of the Committee on Government Operations
of the House of Representatives, or of any seven members thereof, shall sub-
mit any information requested of it relating to any matter within the jurisdic-
tion of the committee.97
Despite interpretations by members of Congress to the contrary,0s
however, the executive branch has negated the impact of section 2954
by adopting a singularly narrow interpretation of the statute based upon
92. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S. CONSr.
art. I, § 1.
93. 343 US. 579 (1952). Article I, § 1 of the Constitution, by the Separation of Powers
doctrine, is a significant check on the President's foreign affairs powers. For the Pres-
ident to deny to Congress, by means of document classification, security information
necessary to carry out its exclusive lawmaking responsibilities may be impermissible
executive control over the functions of the legislative branch. Compare note 71 supra.
94. See notes 71, 72, 75, and 78 supra.
95. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Said the Court on the subject of foreign relations:
There are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touching foreign
relations are political questions [citing Oetjen]. Not only does resolution of
such issues frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application, or
involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive
or legislature; but many such questions uniquely demand single-voiced state-
ment of the Government's views. Yet it is error to suppose that every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.
Our cases in this field seem invariably to show a discriminating analysis of the
particular question posed, in terms of the history of its management by the
political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in light of its nature
and posture in the specific case, and of the possible consequences of judicial
action.
Id. at 211.
96. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 378.
97. 5 US.C. § 2954 (1970).
98. See, e.g., letter from John D. Ehrlichman to the Hon. Henry S. Reuss, June 20,
1970, in Hearings on the Pentagon Papers, supra note 4, at 787-88; letter from the Hon.
John E. Moss to the Hon. Melvin R. Laird, June 18, 1971, id. at 9; and letter from the
Hon. Ogden Reid and six other members of Congress to the Hon. Melvin R. Laird,
June 28, 1971, id. at 327-28.
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its legislative history.99 This interpretation has been much criticized by
members of Congress.100
B. EXEcuTVE PRIVILEGE AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW
There is no express provision in the Constitution creating or affirming
a right in the people to be informed of all the goings-on in the Govern-
ment. Such a right is perhaps to be implied from the Preamble to the
Constitution; 01 or, perhaps the Ninth Amendment 02 may in time
provide the basis for the Court's declaring a new "penumbral right" to
certain government-held information, similar to other recently dis-
covered penumbral rights.1 03
99. 5 U.S.C. § 2954 (1970) is derived from the Act of May 29, 1928, ch. 901, § 2, 45
Stat. 986. The interpretation of this Act by the Justice Department was aired before
the House Government Operations Committee in June 1971:
Section 1 of that act [Act of May 29, 1928] provided for the repeal of 128
statutes requiring the submission of reports to Congress, which either had be-
come obsolete or which served no useful purpose.
Section 2 of the 1928 act, which has now become section 2954 of title 5,
United States Code, was designed to enable Congress to obtain, if needed, the
information theretofore contained in the discontinued report. And we think
that is indicated in the Senate report made to the Congress in the enactment
of the 1928 statute, and I will quote from that:
To save any question of the House of Representatives to have furnished
to it any of the information contained in the reports proposed to be
abolished, a provision has been added to the bill requiring such informa-
tion to be furnished to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Department or upon the request of any seven members thereof.
This section makes it possible to require any report discontinued by the
language of this bill to be re-submitted to either House upon its necessity
becoming evident to the membership of either body.
That is the end of the quotation from the Senate report. And it was our
conclusion that the legislative history from which the section was derived
indicates that its purpose was to serve as a vehicle for obtaining information
theretofore embodied in routine annual reports to Congress submitted by the
several agencies rather than the extremely broad purpose, which I cheerfully
concede is a permissible interpretation of the language itself.
Statement of Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Hearings on the Pentagon Papers, supra
note 4, at 785.
100. For an interpretation of section 2954 by Rep. Frank Horton and Rep. Paul
McCloskey, see id. at 785-86.
101. "WE THE PEOPLE of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this
CONSTITUTION for the United States of America." U.S. CONsT. preamble. The argu-
ment would be that the public, as the collective source of all Constitutional power to
withhold government information, has not consented to the exercise of that power
against it by its servants.
102. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CoNsr. amend. IX.
103. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy); Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (right to travel); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958) (right to associate and privacy in one's associations); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) and Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1 (1967) (rights of marriage and
procreation); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wisc. 1970), appeal dismissed,
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The public's "right to know" does, nevertheless, receive indirect
support from the Constitutional guarantees of the First Amendment. 104
For example, the virtual Constitutional prohibition of prior restraints
on expression, 0 5 most recently affirmed in the Pentagon Papers case,10
is recognition of the need for an enlightened citizenry. Whatever may
be the status of the public's "right to know," it is clearly the basic
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve this right.1 07
The power of the executive branch to withhold information "specifi-
cally required by executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy"108 has been legislatively sanctioned
by Congress and judicially upheld by the courts in a number of cases. 100
As Chief Judge Bazelon reasoned in Soucie v. David'10-a suit brought
under the Freedom of Information Act-the power of Congress to force
disclosure of records to the public is no greater than its power to force
disclosure of records to Congress itself. Secrecy as between the executive
400 US. 1 (1970), Roe v. Wade, 41 U.S.L.W. 4213 (US. Jan. 22, 1973), and Doe v.
Bolton, 41 US.L.W. 4233 (US. Jan. 22, 1973) (mothers right to refuse to carry an un-
quickened embryo). See also United States v. Vuitch, 402 US. 62, 74 (1971) (dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas).
104. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom ... of the press ......
U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
105. For the development of the Court's thinking on the doctrine of "prior restraints,"
see Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 US. 616,
624 (1919) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes); Near v. Minnesota, 283 US. 697
(1931); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 US. 58 (1963); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 US. 713 (1971).
106. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 US. 713 (1971). See the opinion of
Mr. Justice Douglas (concurring), id. at 724, wherein he says: "Secrecy in government
is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open debate and
discussion of public issues are vital to our national health. On public issues there should
be 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate."
107. See the opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart (concurring), in the Pentagon Papers
case, wherein he states:
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas
of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and
power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an
enlightened citizenry in an informed and critical public opinion which alone
can here protect the values of democratic government. For this reason, it is
perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the
basic purpose of the First Amendment. For without an informed and free press
there cannot be an enlightened people.
Id. at 728.
108. 5 US.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
109. See Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 US. 965
(1970); EPA v. Mink, 41 US.L.W. 4201 (US. Jan. 22, 1973); and Moss/Reid/Fisher v.
Laird, CA. No. 1254-71 (D.D.C. 1971). The failure of the Freedom of Information Act
to carry out its intended purpose is discussed in Statement of Mr. Mitchell Rogovin,
Hearings on U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices-Administration and
Operation of the Freedom of Information Act, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 5, at 1490
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on the Freedom of Information Act].
110. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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branch and the public is, then, rather dearly circumscribed by the
restrictions contained in section 552(b)."'t
II
THE PRACTICE OF SECRECY BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The exercise of their respective powers and rights, both Constitutional
and statutory, by the executive branch, Congress, and the public con-
cerning government documents and information, has, on a number of
occasions, resulted in conflict betweenithe executive branch and Con-
gress, and between the executive branch and the public.
A. RECENT PRAacrIcEs, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS
1. The "Operation Keelhaul" File
The case of Epstein v. Resor"2 was decided by the Ninth Circuit upon
the Army's assertion that the information sought fell within the section
552(b)(1) exemption. The information sought by Professor Epstein per-
tained to "Operation Keelhaul," the American-British forced repatria-
tion of approximately two million Soviet nationals unwilling to return
to their homeland. The "Operation Keelhaul" file is classified "top
secret," ostensibly indicating that disclosure of the file would lead to
"exceptionally grave damage to the national security"" 3 such as a break
in diplomatic relations, an armed attack, or a compromise of military
or defense plans. Perhaps realizing the absurdity of this classification,
the White House, on October 22, 1970 (four months after the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in the case), offered the following information:
The U.S. Government has absolutely no objection (based on the contents
of the files) to the declassification and release of the Operation Keelhaul files.
However, given the joint origin of the documents, British concurrence is
necessary before they can be released, and this concurrence has not been re-
ceived. Thus we have no alternative but to deny your request.114
This continued classification of the "Operation Keelhaul" fie by the
Department of Defense suggests that co-classification with a foreign
111. 5 US.C. § 552 (1970). See note 82 supra.
112. 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
113. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. -, 37 Fed. Reg. 5209 (1972), 50 U.S.C.A. § 401
note, at § I(A) (Supp. July 1972).
114. Letter from the White House to Mr. Julius Epstein, October 22, 1970, in Hear-
ings on the Pentagon Papers, supra note 4, at 802.
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government is an additional basis, incorporated into section 552(b)(1),
for the classification of documents. 1 5
The continued classification of the "Operation Keelhaul" file il-
lustrates two additional problems with the present system of security
classification. One problem is the lack of provision in Executive Order
11,652 for accelerated declassification of documents in cases where
circumstances warrant accelerated release of the information." 0 With
respect to the "Operation Keelhaul" file, the White House concedes that
information could be released but for the lack of British concurrence
in declassification.1'1 Yet even with British concurrence, Executive
Order 11,652 prescribes no procedure by which classified information
such as the "Operation Keelhaul" file could be released sooner than
would be called for under the Order's twelve-year declassification step
method.
Another weakness in the Freedom of Information Act is raised by
the Epstein v. Resor illustration. Individual members of the public
must absorb the cost of litigation in any suits they raise under the Act
to enforce their right to government information. The prospect of
costly litigation may be a considerable deterrent to the enforcement
of one's rights under the Act. A possible means of dealing with this
problem would be an amendment to the Freedom of Information Act;
the federal courts could be authorized to provide reasonable attorney's
fees and court costs to members of the public who bring a suit under
the Act in those cases where the Government's position is not ultimately
sustained.118
115. See note 114 supra, and accompanying text.
116. Section 5 contains no requirement to depart from the rules of the General
Declassification Schedule that spread out Top Secret to declassification over a10-year period, even when classified information no longer requires protection.
STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION OF THE
HoUsE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 92ND CONG., 2ND Sass., SECTION-BY-SECrION
COMPAISON AND ANALYSIS OF ExEcuTrVE ORDmS 10501 and 11652, "CLAssIFICATION AND
DECLASSrCATION OF NATIONAL SEcuarrY INFORMATION AND MATEaLA." [hereinafter cited
as SECTION-BY-SECrION COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS], in 118 CONG. REC. E2774, E2778 (daily
ed. March 21, 1972). A summary of this report is contained in Hearings on Security
Classification Problems, supra note 10, at 2849.
117. See note 114 supra, and accompanying text.
118. For such an amendment, see H.R. 15,172, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., at § 2 (1972).
No such provision exists in present law and regulations, perhaps accounting for the
fact that fewer than 200 suits have been initiated under the Freedom of Information
At since 1967. Hearings on the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 109, at 1376.
Section 2 of the proposed H.R. 15,172 would have the desirable effect of removing
financial obstacles hindering public access to government-held information, while at
the same time discouraging frivolous or otherwise non-meritorious suits. While an
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2. Classification of the Garwin Report
In May 1970, seven members of the House Committee on Government
Operations, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2954,119 requested from the Office of
Science and Technology (of the Executive Office of the President) a copy
of the Garwin Report, written in 1969 and known to be critical of the
proposed SST project then being considered in Congress. 2° The request
was denied on the ground that the report constituted "an internal gov-
ernmental memorandum of a confidential nature, which cannot be re-
leased."121 The denial was based, not upon section 552(b)(5) of the
Freedom of Information Act, but upon the executive privilege permitted
by the narrow interpretation of section 2954 referred to above.122
The failure of seven members of the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations to obtain a copy of the Garwin Report indicates that
the executive branch is unwilling to invoke the exemptions of the
Freedom of Information Act against members of Congress acting in their
official capacities. Rather, the executive branch continues to rely upon
its own interpretation of 5 U.S.C. § 2954,123 hence permitting the ex-
ercise of the executive privilege.
This particular example of information withheld by the executive
branch from members of Congress illustrates the problem of classifica-
tion of information for considerations other than national security.124
Attaching the label "internal government memorandum" to the Garwin
Report was really more an exercise of "political privilege" than execu-
tive privilege. To withhold or to release secret government information
is to wield considerable political power. In the present case, the with-
improvement, section 2 may nevertheless have a chilling effect on the public's desire to
exercise their rights under the Act.
119. See note 97 supra, and accompanying text.
120. Letter from John A. Blatnik, et aL., to Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, May 25, 1970, in
Hearings on the Pentagon Papers, supra note 4, at 787.
121. Letter from John D. Ehrlichman to the Hon. Henry S. Reuss, id. at 787-88.
122. See notes 85 and 99 supra.
123. See note 99 supra, and accompanying text.
124. This criticism has been expounded upon by author and political commentator
David Wise:
The fact is that the highest officials of the Government, including Presidents,
regularly and frequently leak classified documents to the press when it suitstheir purposes.
Government officials have come to regard information as a policy tool and
classified information all the more so, since it is, under normal circumstances,
entirely under Government control.
Statement of David Wise, Hearings on the Pentagon Papers, supra note 4, at 330. See
also the statement of Clark R. Mollenhoff, id. at 885.
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holding of the Garwin Report was a dear attempt by the executive
branch to increase the political strength of SST supporters in Congress.
It is very doubtful whether the public benefitted in any way from such
an arbitrary and political exercise of the executive privilege.
A possible solution to the problem of who should determine why in-
formation is or remains classified may be the establishment of some sort
of Classification Review Commission. 125 Where a conflict arises over
information withheld by the executive branch from the Congress or the
public, the dispute could be submitted to the Commission for settlement.
The Commission could prescribe regulations for classifying and de-
classifying information, and perhaps prescribe and enforce penalties for
violation of Executive Order 11,652, 5 U.S.C. § 2954, and the Freedom
of Information Act.12
3. Denial of Information Concerning Pakistan and Laos
In March, 1971, when Congress was considering a bill authorizing
foreign assistance for Pakistan, the Department of State denied a re-
quest for factual accounts of what was happening in East Bengal,
stating that it was "not [their] practice to reveal these communica-
tions."127
Also in March 1971, certain members of Congress requested of the
Department of Defense photographs and other information relating
to the bombing of villages in northern Laos. The request was denied,
in a letter by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, in the following
language:
In sum, I cannot see that the cause of the civilians in Laos will be advanced
by our further exchange of photographs. The public record is as complete re-
garding our efforts to minimize the effect of the war on Laotian civilians as we
can make it without disclosing information which the enemy would certainly
use further to endanger the lives of our piots.128
125. For such a proposal see H.R. 15,172, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., at § 4(9(1) (1972).
126. The Commission, if established, would be subject to several possible weaknesses,
including the possibility that it might become partisan; that it could become an instru-
mentality of private interest groups; and that it might generate conflict rather than
settlement. On the other hand, the proposed Commission would be endowed with con-
siderable powers, including the power to promulgate regulations for the classification
of documents, a power now exerdsed by the President. A significant feature of the pro-
posed Commission is that two-thirds of the Commission membership would be appointed
by Congressional leadership.
127. See Testimony of the Hon. Paul McCloskey, Hearings on the Freedom of In-formation Act, supra note 109, at 1460.
128. Letter from Dennis J. Doolon to the Hon. Paul McCloskey, June 11, 1971, in
Hearings on the Pentagon Papers, supra note 4, at 696.
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These two incidents show that perhaps the greatest obstacle to the
release of government information pursuant to a legitimate request is
the invocation of President Nixon's policy of "negotiation and ac-
commodation."' 29 The actual "negotiation and accommodation" pro-
cedure may extend over many months, thus totally frustrating the
original effort to obtain the information sought. Authority for with-
holding information from members of Congress under the policy of
"negotiation and accommodation" is certainly questionable in the
absence of an express claim of executive privilege. Often information
will be denied to members of Congress by agencies of the executive
branch without reliance on the section 552(b) exemptions of the Free-
dom of Information Act, and with no express claim of executive privi-
lege.8 0 Nevertheless, individual members of Congress are unable to
compel disclosure of the requested information by the simple fact that
the information sought is in the physical possession of an uncoopera-
tive agency of the executive branch.I s
In addition, these separate incidents of March 1971 illustrate the
long term consequences of government secrecy-the public's loss of
confidence in the Government.182 The inability of members of Congress,
let alone the public, to obtain information concerning events in Palds-
tan and Laos (after repeated attempts in the case of photos taken over
Laos) only serves to widen the so-called "credibility gap" between the
executive branch and the public. Congressional recognition and asser-
tion of its full legislative power under the Constitution may go a long
way to restore credibility to some areas of United States foreign policy. 33
4. The "Pentagon Papers"
The Pentagon Papers case triggered considerable debate over the
use of secrecy by the executive branch in the conduct of foreign rela-
129. See note 49 supra, and accompanying text.
130. See Hearings on Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Informtion by the
Executive Before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (1971).
131. See note 66, supra.
132. See Hearings on the Pentagon Papers, supra note 4, at 60.
133. See the statement of Philip Kurland, Hearings on, the Pentagon Papers, supra
note 4, at 801. The magnitude of the danger is underscored by Edward Livingstone:
No nation ever yet found any inconvenience from too dose an inspection into
the conduct of its officers, but many have been brought to ruin, and reduced
to slavery, by suffering gradual imposition and abuses, which were imper-
ceptible, only becamuse the means of publicity had not been secured.
Quoted in Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 995 (3d Cir. 1951).
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dons. While the case was pending before the Supreme Court, a sub-
committee of the House Committee on Government Operations' 84
commenced hearings on United States Government information policies
and practices. 185 During these hearings and while the case was still
pending, the President released the 47-volume study on the war, classi-
fied "top secret-sensitive," to Congress. 36 However, the President made
it clear that this action was not due to requests by members of Con-
gressl 3r brought under section 552 or otherwise, but because a situation
had been created "in which Congress would necessarily be making
judgments ...on the basis of incomplete data which could give a
distorted impression of the reports' contents." 38
The success of Congress in obtaining access to the "Pentagon Papers"
demonstrates the importance of publicity and favorable public opinion
in forcing disclosure of government secrets. The fact that the "Pentagon
Papers" were classified "top secret-sensitive" illustrates a frequent abuse
of the present classification system-the use of unauthorized classifica-
tion symbols.'8 9 Finally, the rationale provided by President Nixon for
the release of the "Pentagon Papers" to Congress' 40 suggests that the
"Pentagon Papers" incident is not a likely precedent to be invoked in
support of future requests made under 5 U.S.C. § 2954 or the Freedom
of Information Act.
The incident of the "Pentagon Papers" suggests three needed re-
forms in the present classification procedures. First, there should be
some provision in Executive Order 11,652 or in some statutory equiva-
lent which would provide for administrative reprimand, suspension, or
134. This subcommittee was the Foreign Operations and Government Information
Subcommittee, chaired by the Hon. William S. Moorhead.
135. Hearings on the Pentagon Papers, supra note 4; Hearings on the Freedom of
Information Act, supra note 109; Hearings on Security Classification Problems, supra
note 10; and Hearings on U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices-Prob.
lems of Congress in Obtaining Information From the Executive Branch, 92nd Cong.,
2nd Sess., pt. 8 (1972).
136. Statement by Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler on the President's decision to
make the study available to Congress, June 23, 1971, in Hearings on the Pentagon
Papers, supra note 4, at 35-36.
137. Letter from the Hon. John E. Moss to Melvin R. Laird, June 18, 1971, in Hear-
ings on the Pentagon Papers, supra note 4, at 9.
138. Statement by Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler on the President's decision to make
the study available to Congress, June 23, 1971, in Hearings on the Pentagon Papers,
supra note 4, at 86.
139. For a list of the classification symbols used by the Department of Defense see
the statement of David 0. Cooke, Hearings on the Pentagon Papers, supra note 4, at
665, 666.
140. See note 138 supra, and accompanying text.
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other disciplinary action against any individual who had classified
information to conceal incompetence, inefficiency, wrongdoing, or ad-
ministrative error, to avoid embarrassment to any individual or agency,
or to prevent or delay release of official information. 41 It is probably
true that many of the "Pentagon Papers" were originally classified for
one or more of these tainted reasons.
Also, there should be some requirement, either by executive order or
by statute, that all departments and agencies with classification powers
maintain a complete list of all their employees exercising classification
authority.142 Such a requirement would tend to discourage over-classifi-
cation and would facilitate disciplinary proceedings when and if neces-
sary.
Finally, there should be some restrictions on the use of classified
government information by former government officials in articles,
books, and memoirs. This problem is not presently within the scope
of Executive Order 11,652.j43
IV
CONCLUSION
Secrecy in the conduct of United States foreign relations dates from
the very founding of the nation. Originally conceived to protect de-
tailed military information in time of war, the practice of secrecy in
the United States Government has since broadened under Executive
Order 11,652. While there exists some Constitutional and statutory
141. Such a provision has been proposed in H.R. 15,172, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., at
§ 4(d)(5)(C) (1972). See the statement of Walter Pincus, Hearings on the Pentagon
Papers, supra note 4, at 863. Compare the proposed section 4(d)(5)(C) with Executive
Order No. 11,652, as quoted in note 44 supra.
142. Such a requirement is embodied in H.R. 15,172, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., at§ 4(d)(3)(A) (1972).
143. Section 11 [of Executive Order No. 11,652] dealing with the declassification
of Presidential Papers, is a subject area not previously contained in Executive
Order 10501.
The inclusion of items (i), (ii), and (Iii) as requirements under which the
archivist is severely restricted in his dedassification authority leaves little sub-
stance to the overall intent of the section. Moreover, the recent incidents of
private publication of Presidential memoirs after the conclusion of his service,
often including references to previously classified information, makes this sec-
tion somewhat academic because there is no procedure for declassifying in-
formation that has already been published.
SrcrrxoN-BY-SEaIxON COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS, supra note 116, at E2786.
See the statement of Jack Anderson, Hearings on Security Classification Problems,
supra note 10, at 2441, for a discussion of former President Lyndon Johnson's memoirs
and their relation to national security.
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basis for Executive Order 11,652, much doubt persists as to the precise
limits of this power and the nature of executive responsibility in the
area of government secrecy. The courts, with few exceptions, have been
reluctant to deal with the problem. While few would deny the need for
some system of document classification the present scheme has fostered
a large number of abuses'4 which unnecessarily deprive the public and
even members of Congress of valuable information, and which permit
bureaucrats to insulate themselves from the consequences of their own
possible incompetence and wrongdoing. In light of these criticisms,
several alternatives to the present system have been proposed, most of
them premised upon initial and positive action by Congress.
Some degree of secrecy in the conduct of foreign relations is vital to
the security of the nation. The peculiar structure of the United States
Government, specifically the separation of powers, creates some unique
problems with respect to the practice of secrecy by the Government and
to the regulation of this practice. The Constitutional authority of the
executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of the Government
in the conduct of foreign relations is not well defined, nor is it likely
to become well defined in the near future. Therefore, the policy and
practice of secrecy in United States foreign relations should be estab-
lished and regulated with active participation by all three branches of
the Government, or, in the alternative, by an entity independent of all
three branches of the Government; but in either case, with primary re-
sponsibility to the American public.
Peter A. Copeland
144. See generally Berger, supra note 10; Nader, Freedom of Information Act: the
Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. CIV. R1IGTs-Cry. LIB. L. REv. 1 (1970); and Giannella,
Agency Procedures Implementing the Freedom of Information Act: A Proposal for
Uniform Regulations, 23 ADMIN. L. Rrv. 217 (1971).
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